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Twenty years of land reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: state of play and outlook 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to gain a perspective on the land reforms in the Central and 
Eastern  European  countries  to  show  the  extent  to  which  the  structure  of  agricultural 
production  left  by  the  socialist  period  has  influenced  the  restructuring  dynamics.  In  this 
context,  the  observed  dual  agricultural  structure  is  seen  as  the  result  of  a  sticking  point 
exacerbated by the agricultural transition’s land component. 
Keywords: transition, land reforms, property rights, initial situation 
JEL classifications: Q15, D23, P32 
 
 
Vingt ans de réformes foncières en Europe Centrale et Orientale : bilan et perspectives 
 
Résumé 
Cet article a pour but de mettre en perspective les réformes foncières qui ont été menées dans 
les  pays  d’Europe  Centrale  et  Orientale  pour  montrer  dans  quelle  mesure  la  structure  de 
production  agricole  héritée  de  la  période  socialiste  a  influencé  les  dynamiques  de 
restructuration. En particulier, la structure agricole duale observée est entendue alors comme 
le résultat d’un effet de blocage que la composante foncière de la transition agricole vient 
aggraver. 
Mots-clefs : transition, réformes foncières, droits de propriété, situation initiale 
Classifications JEL : Q15, D23, P32 
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Twenty years of land reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: state of play and outlook 
 
1.   Introduction 
The economic transition in the Central and Eastern European countries involved a reallocation 
of  resources  to  boost  production  efficiency,  and  called  for  market-based  price  and  trade 
reforms and the privatisation of state-controlled production means (see Bignebat et al., 2009). 
In the agricultural sector, privatisation entailed land reforms since land is generally the main 
factor  input.  Land  legislation  was  among  the  first  to  be  passed  by  the  new  governments 
elected at the end of the centrally-controlled regime. They were well aware of the vital need to 
privatise  the  land  to  maintain  their  countries’  food  production.  The  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries chose different forms of privatisation (restitution and/or redistribution) 
with mixed results. On the one hand, land fragmentation due to the privatisation method used 
and consolidation problems contributed to the persistence of small structures. On the other 
hand, large structures - state farms and collective farms - continued to operate through the 
transition. These factors have given rise to a duality in land structures. We put forward the 
hypothesis  that,  contrary  to  the  dynamics  observed  in  developing  countries,  where  land 
privatisation is portrayed as an endogenous development due to growing land pressure, the 
initial conditions in place prior to the transition in the Central and Eastern European countries 
have played a key role in the development observed. Maurel (2006) concludes that the success 
of the economic reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries depends primarily on 
their historical and geographical heritage. In the agricultural sector, the “firm” component of 
the agricultural transition, i.e. the privatisation of state farms and collective farms as a whole 
(and not just the privatisation of the land), can hinder the reallocation of factor inputs as 
documented by the literature. This sticking point is exacerbated by the land aspect of the 
reforms conducted. The following section explains these land reforms. 
 
2.  The need for the land reforms and the methods used 
2.1.  The economic need for the reforms 
Many  authors  have  pointed  out  the  economic  benefits  of  land  reforms  in  the  developing 
countries, especially the economic utility of the emergence of individual ownership rights. 
Although these benefits also apply to the countries with a centrally-controlled regime up to Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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1989, the reform methods used generally differ due to a characteristic that is specific to these 
countries: the initial situation. 
Ownership rights and the initial situation 
We consider the initial situation to be that which prevailed before the start of the transition 
period. The initial situations actually varied. The land collectivisation process launched in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  after  the  Second  World  War  was  not 
uniform across these countries. Civici and Jouve (2009) highlight the importance of resistance 
by farmers, historical traditions and political relations with the Soviet regime. For example, 
Poland  and  Yugoslavia  avoided  large-scale  agrarian  collectivisation  and  have  always 
maintained a large agricultural sector under individual ownership. In the Central and Eastern 
European  countries  (with  the  exception  of  Poland  and  Yugoslavia),  pre-transition  land 
ownership was dominated by de facto control by state and collective farms – even though 
ownership  rights  remained  individual  in  law  except  in  certain  cases,  such  as  in  Hungary 
(Macours  and  Swinnen,  2002).  However,  in  the  former  Soviet  countries  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States,  land  ownership  on  the  eve  of  the  transition  was 
collective, and had been for over 70 years. Most of the former communist countries opted for 
large industrial production structures in two possible forms: a) state farms organised along the 
same lines as a firm, where employees received a wage and the state held all the rights to 
control investment and production; and b) collective farms very similar to state farms, but 
where worker remuneration was based on production (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). Despite 
substantial  economies  of  scale,  many  empirical  studies  have  concluded  that  these  large 
structures were inefficient (e.g. Brada and King, 1993). Firstly, the separation of ownership 
and management did not give the workers enough incentive to work in a situation where 
earnings had little to do with the farm’s performance. Secondly, labour supervision problems 
in these large-scale structures generated high transaction costs (Pollak, 1985; Schmitt, 1991). 
Thirdly, many collective and state farms ran at loss in the absence of any credible threat of 
bankruptcy  or  penalties  for  non-payment  of  loans  granted  by  the  central  bank:  the  state 
granted generous government subsidies and allowed debt payments to be deferred (the soft 
budget constraint defined by Kornai, 1980). This situation did not concern the agricultural 
sector alone. The start of the economic transition therefore marked the start of reforms to 
remove  price  distortions  induced  by  the  centrally-controlled  system  and  to  re-establish 
incentives to guarantee farm profitability. In agriculture, this involved the liberalisation of the 
sector and the privatisation of production means, including the land. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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We draw on Barzel’s analysis (1997, p. 3) to define three types of ownership rights that can 
be transferred when an asset is privatised: the right to the profit generated by the asset, the 
right of use and the right of disposal - with the last two also being taken as a right of control 
over the asset. 
Private ownership rights, incentives and market efficiency 
The question of the economic benefits of land privatisation has been largely addressed by 
theoretical analyses conducted in development economics. The allocation of ownership rights, 
especially if they are individual, first secures land ownership and then encourages investment 
(Deiniger and Feder, 2001). Uncertainty over the returns on investment, due to the possibility 
of a third party creating an ex-post hold-up problem with the proceeds of this investment by 
claiming ownership of the good, discourages producers from committing to outlays that they 
could not recover in the event of a dispute. 
Literature on the firm and its restructuring in a period of transition to a market economy raises 
another advantage to the privatisation of state farms. It finds that the links between the state 
(which, in the case of state farms, holds the right of control and the right to the profit) and the 
production unit imply the adoption of objectives often different to economic efficiency goals 
(Schleifer  and  Vishny,  1994),  such  as  sustaining  employment:  given  that  privatisation 
allocates  the  right  of  control  over  the  firm  to  private  agents,  production  and  investment 
decisions are more efficient. However, some analyses use the same theoretical framework to 
highlight the importance of the privatisation method. In particular, the transfer of shares to 
insiders,  i.e.  company  employees,  when  the  firm  is  privatised  has  been  largely  criticised: 
managers can take advantage of it to divert assets for themselves and take control of the firm, 
hence  aggravating  the  soft  budget  constraint  problem  as  the  state  refinances  insolvent 
businesses (Debande and Friebel, 1995). 
Lastly, where private owners have a right of disposal, privatisation allows for an efficient 
allocation of production means among heterogeneous individuals. In particular, as regards 
land  ownership  (Deiniger  and  Feder,  2001;  Otsuka,  1985),  the  permanent  or  temporary 
transferability of the land encourages the reallocation of ownership, at least in the form of the 
right of use, to the relatively more productive units. Assuming that small farms, i.e. family 
farms, have a comparative advantage over large farms – due to lower labour supervision costs 
because they have no employees (Allen and Lueck, 1998) and in a situation of credit and 
labour  market  imperfections  (Feder,  1985)  –  the  large  state  businesses  would  have  to 
downsize, and smaller, individual farms would logically emerge from the old farms or be Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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started up. Once again, the chosen method of privatisation should influence this relocation. In 
particular, in the case of the privatisation of collective or state farms by sale to insiders, the 
theoretical analysis shows that even an inefficient firm will not necessarily be bought out by 
outsiders  (people  from  outside  the  firm),  generally  assumed  to  be  more  efficient  in  their 
management of the firm, since the coalition created by insiders raises their reserve sale price 
(Aghion and Blanchard, 1998). Similarly, some analyses of the reallocation of resources in 
transition economies (e.g. Bolton et al., 1997) find that the transfer of ownership proves tricky 
where there are no prior savings at national level. At individual level, the literature makes this 
same  observation  of  the  developing  countries,  where  private  land  ownership  can  enable 
producers to propose collateral as security when applying for credit (Deininger and Feder, 
2001). 
Particularities 
In the case of the developing countries, Binswanger et al. (1985) are among the authors who 
analyse the emergence of individual private ownership rights as arising from greater land 
scarcity. This puts pressure on land and triggers an increase in the implicit value of the land 
(in the absence of markets) and therefore places a high opportunity cost on securing the land 
resource. The individualisation of ownership rights is described here as endogenous to the 
process of economic development. However, the transition countries start with a cohesive set 
of institutions based on collective or state ownership. This is followed by a break, in the form 
of privatisation, and then a shift towards new production structures via factor reallocation. In 
these circumstances, it is impossible to ignore the transition period’s initial conditions, which 
some  studies  have  underscored  as  being  decisive  (Macours  and  Swinnen,  2002,  for  the 
agricultural  sector,  for  example).  In  particular,  the  transition  economies  have  inherited  a 
specific  agricultural  production  structure  and  an  agricultural  sector  comprising  state  and 
collective firms. Land reform consequently takes in an organisational aspect, as least in part, 
due  to  the  privatisation  of  the  production  structures.  Unlike  certain  developing  countries 
where land reforms are autonomous and can consist of a simple land securitisation operation 
based on what is already there, land reforms in the transition countries cannot be analysed 
separately from the set of reforms to restructure the farms left over from the socialist period. 
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
 
  7 
2.2.  The land reforms: several possible processes 
Three options were available for the reallocation of collective and state ownership to the 
people:  restitution,  redistribution  or  a  combination  of  the  two.  Restitution  consisted  of 
restoring ownership to the original owners, i.e. those who owned the land before the imposed 
collectivisation. In general, so much time had passed between this collectivisation and the 
start  of  the  land  reforms  that  the  restitution  had  to  be  made  to  the  heirs,  often  the 
grandchildren of the initial owners. Redistribution consisted of distributing shares in land or 
capital to the people. These shares could be distributed free of charge or sold at auction to any 
citizen or primarily to collective and state farm workers. 
The Central and Eastern European countries chose restitution, with the exception of Albania, 
which opted for redistribution like the Soviet Union countries. Although the Soviet countries 
felt that restitution was the fairest reallocation process, they thought it unrealistic because they 
would  have  had  to  find  out  who  the  owners  were  70  years  previously  (Lerman,  2001). 
Another argument put forward against restitution was to avoid ethnic divisions in sensitive 
areas  (e.g.  in  the  Transnistria  region  in  Moldova  on  the  border  with  Ukraine)  and  avoid 
restoring  lands  to  foreigners  who  owned  them  before  collectivisation  (e.g.  Germans  in 
Moldova)  (Gorton  and  White,  2003).  Two  countries,  Hungary  and  Romania,  opted  for 
restitution combined with redistribution. 
Privatisation of the collective and state farms therefore potentially implied a fragmentation of 
their production means and the total dismantlement of these entities. However, this was not 
automatic since employees receiving shares of capital and land could choose: i) to leave with 
these shares, ii) to sell them for cash to the farms replacing the collective and state farms, or 
iii)  to  leave  them  in  these  farms  as  owners,  hence  making  themselves  shareholders  or 
landlords. The choice between the first option and the third option came down to a decision 
between  starting  up  their  own  individual  farm  (de  novo  farms)  with  the  capital  and  land 
received  or  remaining  a  member  of  a  collective  farm.  Several  authors  have  proposed 
conceptual  analytic  frameworks  to  explain  employees’  choices  such  as,  for  example,  a 
comparison of the utilities of the two options, net of exit costs (costs to recuperate their shares 
and costs to start up a new farm), and have put forward a number of factors behind their 
decisions (individuals’ characteristics, profitability of the collective or state farm, price and 
production  risk,  transaction  costs  on  the  land  market,  share  capital,  etc.)  (Mathijs  and 
Swinnen, 1998; Rizov et al., 2001; Slangen et al., 2004). 
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3.  The mixed results of two decades 
3.1.   Imperfect land markets and fragmented ownership 
In general, there were few transactions on the land markets during the transition period. For 
example, only around 0.2% of the entire country’s utilised agricultural area was sold in the 
Czech Republic from 1993 to 2001 (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006). There are a number of 
reasons for this sluggishness. First of all, the reallocation of land via the attribution of shares 
created virtual ownership rights: beneficiaries had to first of all understand the principle and 
how to transform these pieces of paper into physical plots (Ferenczi, 2005). The conversion 
procedures themselves  were often complex (Graefen, 2002). Moreover, trade in land was 
prohibited under the communist regime. Consequently, the land reforms had to first create the 
hitherto non-existent institutions required for this trade (land registry, land registry offices, 
land valuation office, etc.). It took time to build these institutions from scratch and it also took 
time for owners to get used to this new institutional set-up. Last but not least, owners were 
often reluctant to sell their land for sentimental or economic reasons (see Section 3.2), but 
also  for  administrative  reasons  (which  can  also  be  likened  to  economic  reasons  when 
considering the resulting transaction costs). These administrative reasons create land market 
imperfections. Land restitution is still not complete after nearly twenty years of land reforms. 
There are a number of reasons for this: the heirs of many deceased owners have not been 
identified; the physical boundaries of certain plots have not yet been able to be delineated 
with certainty; and the land registration procedures are long and complicated, making the land 
registry incomplete. Corruption is commonplace and changes to land legislation are frequent, 
making ownership rights uncertain. Lastly, sellers and buyers are subject to extremely high 
land transaction costs (plot identification costs, valuation, registration, etc.) (Latruffe and Le 
Mouël, 2006). For example, these costs were estimated at 10% to 30% of the value of a 
transaction in Romania. A number of surveys conclude that these transaction costs are a major 
reason for non-participation in the land market (Swinnen and Vranken, 2005). Alongside the 
land market imperfections, credit market imperfections hinder land purchases. Loan interest 
rates are high due to a risky economic situation, a lack of skills among the new banks, and the 
farmers’ inexperience as loan applicants (the credit market did not exist under the communist 
regime). Moreover, the banks rarely accept farmland as collateral (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; 
Latruffe, 2005). 
So the land reforms have not managed to create an operational land market as there are still so 
many  imperfections.  In  addition,  they  have  generated  highly  fragmented  ownership.  This Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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fragmentation  is  rooted  in  the  reforms  themselves,  which  have  redistributed  or  restituted 
microplots, following which land consolidation has been impracticable on underdeveloped 
land markets. For example, a 2005 survey finds that tenanted land on large Slovakian farms 
(private firms or cooperatives) was owned by 789 individual owners on average (Latruffe and 
Davidova,  2007).  In  Bulgaria,  a  2003  survey  shows  that  farming  households  owned  an 
average of six plots with an average size of 0.6 hectares per plot (Vranken et al., 2004). The 
Czech Republic currently counts a reported 3.5 million very small owners (Latruffe et al., 
2008).  Some  countries  have  launched  land  consolidation,  but  this  is  made  extremely 
problematic  by  the  rather  vague  delimitations  of  plot  boundaries  and  still-missing  land 
registry  registrations.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  for  example,  just  8%  of  the  land  has  been 
consolidated to date (Latruffe et al., 2008). 
3.2.   An unexpected evolution towards a dual agricultural structure 
The land reforms were supposed to give rise to the creation of middle-sized farms such as 
those that prevail in Western countries. As explained in Section 2, the creation of ownership 
rights and the dismantlement of collective and state farms were meant to foster trade in land 
plots, the exit of the least efficient farms from the agricultural sector, and the creation or 
expansion of more efficient farms. Small subsistence farms below the critical size required for 
economies  of  scale,  and  very  large  farms  suffering  from  high  transaction  costs  and 
diseconomies of scale, were consequently supposed to disappear to be replaced by middle-
sized individually-owned farms. The idea was that these middle-sized farms would be started 
up  from  scratch  (de  novo  farms)  or  created  from  the  expansion  of  existing  farms,  hence 
combining the two advantages of economies of scale and low transaction costs. 
Yet nearly twenty years on from the launch of the reforms, the move in this direction has not 
been as clear as hoped. First of all, the dismantlement of the collective and state farms has not 
been  systematic.  Although  legislation  has  phased  out  these  two  legal  statuses,  very  large 
collective farms still exist in practice, even though there are fewer of them. The state farms 
have often been bought out by some of their managers, who have turned them into private 
firms  (limited  liability  companies  and  joint  stock  companies).  These  businesses  cover 
hundreds of hectares and employ hundreds of employees. Some of them, purchased by private 
funds initially invested in non-agricultural activities, are thriving (Rylko et al., 2008). The 
collective farms have kept their collective attributes, in general, taking on the legal status of 
cooperatives: owned by a number of partners, managed by an elected board, often on a “one 
man-one vote” basis, they cover thousands of hectares and employ thousands of employees. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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There are a number of reasons why the large farms are still there. The heirs of the former 
owners, generally their grandchildren, received the ownership rights to the plots restituted by 
the land reforms. Yet most of them are urban dwellers and have no links with agriculture. 
Setting up an individual farm themselves would have been too expensive. Finding a buyer 
would  also  have  meant  high  transaction  costs  due  to  the  land  market  imperfections.  The 
cheapest option for these heirs was therefore to leave their plot leased out to the new farm 
(company or cooperative). Amblard and Colin (2006) report, for example, that some 20% to 
50% of collective-type farm owners (agricultural societies) in Romania are urban landlords. 
The former collective and state farm employees, who received a share of these farms from the 
redistributions, faced the same options. The difference was that these employees already had 
farming skills and could have started up an individual farm more easily. Nevertheless, the 
share they received was generally too small and they would have had to buy additional plots, 
which would have meant an expensive transaction on the imperfect land market. Moreover, 
many of them found that there were more benefits to joining a cooperative (services such as a 
canteen and remuneration in kind), and this was often the option that best suited their personal 
convictions carried over from the socialist period (collective farming). Another major reason 
that argued against the creation of new individually-owned farms was risk. Setting up one’s 
own farm in the first decade of transition was quite a risky business: the economic situation 
was bleak, prices and policies were unstable, and the creation of upstream and downstream 
infrastructures (which did not exist under the communist regime) was not rapid. The last 
reason that can be put forward to explain the low rate of withdrawal of individually-owned 
land from the collective and state farms concerns the difficulties involved in, and hence the 
cost of, such withdrawal. After decades of collectivisation and no land registry, it was hard, if 
not impossible to find the boundaries of the plots. Some plots were in the middle of land 
farmed by collective or state farms, which were consequently required to find an identical 
substitute plot in another place. And then after two generations, a single plot was often found 
to have a number of heirs, which made selling decisions difficult. 
Alongside the sustained operation of very large farms, a multitude of very small holdings 
have also continued to exist. These are generally semi-subsistence farms with little or no 
commercial orientation (Pouliquen’s “microfundia”, 1999). The main reason for this is the 
economic situation during the transition, in particular a high unemployment rate and soaring 
inflation. These circumstances left farming as the only option in rural areas, and the land itself 
was seen as a safety net for the rural dwellers and for the workers who had lost their jobs in Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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the collapse of the state-controlled industrial sector (Bafoil et al., 2003). A second reason 
worth mentioning concerns essentially Poland: the agricultural pension in this country (drawn 
from the KRUS pension fund) was much more generous than the pension paid to workers 
from  the  other  sectors,  and  the  pension  claim  requirements  were  not  too  hard  to  meet 
(claimants simply had to have owned at least one hectare of land for a number of years of paid 
contributions). This policy encouraged many farmers to hang on to their small plots of land. 
The third and last aspect that could explain why small holdings have survived has to do with 
attitudes: after decades living under a regime that did not allow personal property, the land 
owned had not only an economic value but also a strong sentimental value. Selling or renting 
it out to other people would have been too evocative of the period of forced collectivisation. 
So the land reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries did not have the effect 
hoped for in terms of agricultural structures. Instead of the expected emergence of medium-
sized structures, the transition gave rise to a dual agricultural sector in which a host of very 
small holdings exist alongside a small number of very large units dominating the lion’s share 
of the agricultural land (see, for example, Bazin and Bourdeau-Lepage, 2009). 
 
4.  Outlook 
Even if the governments of the Central and Eastern European countries were aware of the 
probable complexity of their planned land reforms, it is doubtful that they were expecting 
them to take so long and they were probably not prepared for the psychological element that 
affected  these  transactions.  The  long-drawn-out  implementation  of  the  reforms  had  an 
unexpected impact on the development of the agricultural structures, with the creation of a 
dual structural system. Today, nearly twenty years after the launch of the land reforms, the 
land markets are still imperfect, and this situation strengthens the dual structure. 
Nevertheless, the continuing existence of small semi-subsistence farms and large structures 
employing hundreds of employees, sometimes superfluous, probably averted a social crisis 
during the difficult period of economic transition by guaranteeing a minimum standard of 
living to millions of people in the rural areas. Pouliquen (1999) believes that this mitigated the 
social cost of the transition. Aware of this social issue, the European Commission ended up 
compromising on this point in accession negotiations, allowing new entrant States to give 
their farmers subsidies in addition to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments. In 
fact, agriculture was a  key issue in the negotiations for the enlargement of the European Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-19 
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Union to the Central and Eastern European countries. Not only was agriculture a vital sector 
in these countries, it also accounted for a large chunk of the European budget (45%) in the 
form  of  farm  subsidies.  To  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,  accession  meant 
getting a slice of this cake with its generous agricultural subsidies. To the Commission and 
the long-standing Member States, however, enlargement meant raising the budgetary share of 
agriculture and hence certain countries’ contributions (such as France and Germany) to the 
European budget. Moreover, many economists felt that it was risky to give farmers in the new 
Member States the same CAP subsidies as farmers in the old Member States, since this could 
put a brake on the restructuring process and strengthen the inefficient structures. At the end of 
the day, it was decided to gradually raise the sum of CAP subsidies granted to new Member 
State farmers through to 2013 (the so-called phasing in process), when they will receive the 
same  amount  as  farmers  in  the  old  Member  States.  However,  given  the  social  stakes  of 
sustaining the agricultural sector, the governments of the new Member States were authorised 
to pay top-ups and special subsidies to small semi-subsistence farms. 
The literature posits that the emergence of individual private land ownership rights in the 
developing  countries  is  the  result  of  growing  pressure  on  land  resources.  This  process 
reportedly makes land reform on the whole relevant and acceptable to the population, who are 
willing to participate by applying for title deeds. The empirical literature is not unanimous 
when it comes to the effectiveness of a land privatisation policy (securitisation, legislation and 
registration). In some cases, it advances more flexible possibilities for various hybrid systems 
somewhere between customary law and statute law (Chaveau and Lavigne Delville, 2002). 
Yet, for the Central and Eastern European countries, the land reforms were one element in a 
set of policies, especially industrial policy, meant to restructure the productive mechanism 
inherited from the socialist period. A mass in-sector and cross-sector reallocation of factor 
inputs was expected: in the presence of subsidies that are holding up the restructuring, it is the 
notion of transition speed that is at stake. 
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